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ABSTRACT: In a participatory democracy where every vote counts, voters expect that every vote will be counted.
The voting machine is the instrument with which the voting public records its intent and appoints its representatives.
In order for the democratic process to function, voting machines must properly function.
Do electronic voting systems that rely on touchscreens work better at reducing undervote and overvote counts than
optical scan systems? To answer this question, an analysis of undervote and overvote counts in the 2002 and 2006
Florida Gubernatorial elections was conducted. The undervote and overvote counts across county, voting system,
system manufacturer, and election cycle were compared. Mean comparison analyses suggest that counties that primarily
used touchscreen technology on Election Day had lower voter error rates than counties using optical scan technology
in the 2006 election. Touchscreen technology is associated with less overvoting. Overall, voter error rates were found
to be higher in the 2006 election than in the 2002 election for optical scan ballots but not for touchscreen systems.
Republication not permitted without written consent of the author.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines voter error across Florida’s 67
counties in the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial elections in
order to analyze and explain any changes in voter error as
represented by undervotes and overvotes across electronic
voting systems. The Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) established a program to provide states with
funds to replace punch card voting systems following
the 2000 elections. Many argue that some voters were
disenfranchised due to poorly designed voting equipment
that year (Agresti and Presnell, 2002; Herron and Sekhon,
2003). HAVA passage prompted the enactment of many
state laws to facilitate its implementation.
HAVA was meant to re-establish voter confidence in
the democratic process. Elections are one of the most
important institutions in a participatory democracy. In
a system in which every vote should count, voters expect
that every vote will be counted. The voting machine is
the instrument with which the voting public records its
intent and appoints its representatives. For the democratic
process to function, voting machines must properly
function. Voting systems that are associated with lower
voter error ensure public confidence. The integrity of the
democratic process is based on the reliability, accuracy,
and verifiability of voting systems, and low voter error is
an indictor of these factors.
Florida Statutes (F. S.) (Section 101.595) mandate that
each county Supervisor of Elections report the total
number of undervotes and overvotes in the first race that
appears on an election ballot to the Florida Department
of State. Pursuant to F.S. Section 97.021, an overvote
means that a voter designates more than one answer to
an office or ballot question, while an undervote shows
that no choice is properly designated for an office or
ballot question. In either case, a vote is not recorded
for that office or ballot question. F.S. Section 102.141
mandates a manual recount if a candidate is defeated
or eliminated by one-half of one percent or less of the
total votes cast for that office. However, if the number
of undervotes, overvotes, and provisional ballots is fewer
than the number of votes needed to change the election
outcome, a recount may not be ordered. In races where
the outcome may be determined by just a few hundred
votes, the need to reduce error is apparent.
Recent history shows Florida’s election process to be
contentious and marked with controversy (Yang and
Gaines, 2004). Hanging, pregnant, and dimpled chads in
the 2000 election, coupled with the more recent incidence
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/5

of high undervoting in the Congressional District 13
race where a recount was rendered impossible due to the
lack of a verified voter paper trail for touchscreen systems
(Wegner, 2007), has resulted in growing concerns over the
reliability and lack of transparency in touchscreen voting
systems. The Florida legislature passed H.B. 537, which
requires that all voting be by marksense ballot (optical
scan ballot) with exceptions for disabled persons. This
law, which takes effect on January 1, 2008, will reduce
the total number of counties using touchscreen machines
to 14 while it brings the total number of counties with
voter-verified paper record legislation (VVPR) to 30.
Twenty counties do not require VVPR (including the
14 that still use touchscreens). My findings may be
applicable to those 14 counties that continue using
touchscreen systems.
The electronic voting systems used in Florida for the
2002 and 2006 elections were based either on optical
scan or on touchscreen technologies. These machines
were manufactured by one of three companies: Election
Systems & Software (ES&S), Diebold, or Sequoia.
Following the 2002 elections, only one county made
changes to its voting system: Baker County switched
from Sequoia Optech to Diebold Marksense systems
(Florida Department of State: Division of Elections,
2003). These two systems use the same optical scan
technology but are produced by different manufacturers.
In the 2006 election cycle, 11 counties used ES&S
iVotronic systems software while four counties used
Sequoia EDGE systems. These systems are touchscreenbased direct-recording electronic voting systems (DRE).
Counties using touchscreen systems also provided optical
scan ballots to absentee voters.
In the 2006 election cycle, 31 counties used Diebold
Accuvote systems, 14 counties used ES&S M100
systems, and seven counties used ES&S Optech systems
(Florida Department of State: Division of Elections,
2007), all of which use optical scan technology. These
counties supplemented their optical scan systems with
touchscreen systems for both early and Election Day
voting in order to accommodate voters with special needs
in accordance with HAVA.
HAVA established federal standards for voting systems
used in federal elections. These same systems are used in
Florida’s elections, resulting in federal election standards
impacting state races. HAVA requires that voting systems
be accessible for individuals with disabilities in a manner
that provides them with the same access and participation
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afforded to other voters. HAVA also requires that at least
one direct recording electronic voting system or other
voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities
be present at each polling place.
Fifty-two of sixty-seven counties used optical scan
systems in the 2002 election cycle. Of these, 51 counties
used the same provider in 2002 and 2006. All 15
touchscreen counties used the same provider in 2002
and 2006. The technology used in Florida counties from
2002 to 2006 stayed constant, with the exceptions of the
introduction of touchscreen systems to supplement the
optical scan systems in 52 counties, the provider change
in Baker County, and ballot design changes made by
individual counties. The statistical comparison of underand overvotes in the empirical analyses is facilitated by so
many counties using the same system across elections.
Touchscreen systems are programmed to prevent
overvoting while they notify voters when they have
undervoted or skipped a ballot item. Optical scan paper
ballots rely on voters to check their own ballot for errors.
Counties using precinct tabulation systems can tabulate
votes immediately and notify voters of any errors, who
may then recast their votes using a new ballot. Lower
overvoting resulted in both the 2002 and 2006 elections
when compared with previous election cycles (Knack
and Kropf, 2003). However, such tabulation systems are
an incomplete safeguard, as counties using optical scan
systems still have some tabulation error resulting from
Election Day overvoting.
Focusing on gubernatorial elections provides a
standardized variable for measuring voter error. Lower
level races may be affected by voter roll-off (Darcy and
Schneider, 1989), with voters abstaining from voting
in those races listed toward the end of the ballot. The
gubernatorial race was first on the ballot for both 2002
and 2006 for all counties. Roll-off effects should have
the least impact on the gubernatorial race, allowing
for a more accurate comparison of the effects of voting
technology on voter error across counties.
In this paper, undervote and overvote counts are compared
by election cycle and by county to analyze trends in voter
or tabulation error across voting technologies. The error
rate for absentee ballots is also compared across counties
and election cycles.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous research has focused on voter error rates caused
Published by STARS, 2006

by punchcard machines (Knack and Kropf, 2003) across
various demographic groups (Alvarez and Sinclair,
2004). These studies focused on mechanical voting
systems because they were the most prevalent voting
system prior to HAVA. Prior research also shows that
lever machines and fill-in ovals (the same technology on
which optical scan is based) have much lower error rates
than punchcard systems (Bullock, 2002).
These studies find that, when using punchcard systems,
African-American and Hispanic voters show higher
voter error rates compared to White voters. However,
such patterns were not evident where counties used
voting equipment that was programmed to eliminate
overvoting. Further, larger counties and counties with a
higher percent of high school graduates showed lower
voter and tabulation error rates.
Optical scan ballots contribute to a black-white voter
error gap (the difference between the average voter error
rates between blacks and whites) of 4-6% (Tomz and
Houweling, 2003). Electronic machines, which prevent
overvoting and make undervoting more noticeable and
correctable, have been found to cut such discrepancies
by a factor of ten (Tomz and Houweling, 2003).
However, a 2001 Caltech/MIT study found that voter
and tabulation error is highest among counties using
electronic machines and punch cards, while it is lowest
among counties using lever machines, optical scan paper
ballots, and hand-counted ballots (Caltech/MIT, 2001).
The researchers conclude that some ballot formats are
more confusing than others. Precincts with higher
proportions of African-American and elderly citizens
are especially impacted by confusing ballot arrangements
(Schneider, 1989).
The accuracy and risk associated with electronic voting
machines (Foster, 2004) continues to be a subject of
academic debate. Computer science experts express
concern over the vulnerability of DRE machines
(including touchscreen) that lack a voter verified paper
trail (Barr and Gondree, 2007). However, the Caltech/
MIT Voting Technology Project argues that the 2004
elections went relatively smoothly as electronic voting
machines record votes more accurately than paper ballots
(Foster, 2004). Election accuracy cannot be independently
verified in states that use DRE technology without
verified voter paper trails even with an available source
code (Barr and Gondree, 2007). Touchscreen counties
in Florida shared this experience in both the 2002 and
2006 elections.
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HYPOTHESES
1. What is the effect of technology
type on voter error?
Hypothesis 1: Counties that use touchscreen voting
systems will have lower voter error rates than counties
that use optical scan voting systems. Touchscreens were
the sole means of voting in 15 counties on Election Day
and for early voting in 2002 and 2006; all else being equal,
these counties should have lower voter error rates, even
when absentee ballots are included in the total error rate.
This hypothesis notes that touchscreen systems allow for
additional safeguards against voter error, while optical
scan paper ballots require voters to review their own
ballots and correct mistakes. Overvoting rates should
not be a significant proportion of the total voter error
rate. Undervoting rates should be very similar to the total
voter error rate in touchscreen counties, but not in optical
scan counties. It is predicted that the undervote should
be the primary contributor to the total voter error rate.
Hypothesis 2: Touchscreen counties and optical scan
counties will have similar undervoting rates for absentee
voting. Both touchscreen and optical scan counties use
the same technology for absentee voting. If technology
is the primary voter error factor, there should be no
difference in error rates for absentee ballots emanating
from different counties. Voters in touchscreen counties
should be equally likely to undervote as voters in optical
scan counties.
Hypothesis 3: For absentee voting, touchscreen counties
will have similar rates of overvoting as optical scan
counties. Absentee ballots have no safeguard to prevent
overvoting, other than the voters’ ability to properly
review their ballots and correct overvoting.
Optical scan paper ballots are used for absentee voting in
all 67 Florida counties, although it should be noted that
the design of those ballots and ballot instructions might
vary by county and ballot manufacturer. Optical scan
ballots normally require that voters complete an arrow,
or fill in an oval, in order to designate a ballot choice. If
an error is made when marking an optical scan ballot, it
is the voter’s responsibility to identify the error and make
corrections or request a new ballot. When the voter has
completed an absentee ballot, it must either be mailed
or delivered to the Supervisor of Elections office in the
county of residence no later than 7 p.m. on Election
Day. This means that absentee voters who fail to correct
errors on their optical scan ballots risk having their votes
voided for that particular office or question. It would be
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/5

too late to make a correction once the ballot tabulator
detects an error.
2. What effect does the manufacturer of
the voting system have on voter error?
Hypothesis 4: The rate of voter error for the ES&S
optical scan system will be similar to the voter error rate
for Diebold optical scan systems. The equipment used
limits ballot design; both Diebold and ES&S optical
scan systems use the same technology. If counties have
correctly designed ballots, the difference in ballot design
afforded by these two different systems should not be
significant enough to cause a gap in the rate of voter
error between them,.
Hypothesis 5: The voter error rate for ES&S touchscreen
systems will be similar to the voter error rate for Sequoia
touchscreen systems in touchscreen counties. Again,
touchscreen systems are limited in their effectiveness by
their physical design and programming. The difference in
effectiveness between systems should not be significant
enough to create a gap in the voter error rate between
them. However, voters and counties unfamiliar with
touchscreen technology may have higher voter error
rates.
Hypothesis 6: The undervoting rate for touchscreen
systems will be higher in optical scan (blended)
counties than in 100% touchscreen counties in 2006.
Counties that supplement their optical scan ballots with
touchscreens to accommodate voters with special needs
or provide an alternative to paper ballots to some voters
will have higher voter error rates. These higher error rates
may result from the lack of experience with touchscreen
systems in counties that have only recently added the
new technology. With new technology comes the need
to retrain poll workers and educate voters. It may take
some time before such retraining efforts reduce voter
error. During this learning curve period, voter error may
be higher for these counties than for counties that have
been using touchscreen technology for several elections.
As previous studies suggest, voter error is associated
with voter familiarity with the polling technology in use
(Knack and Kropf, 2003).
METHODOLOGY
Data is collected from the Florida Division of Elections
and from the Supervisors of Elections offices across the
state in order to construct the variables employed. The
following is a list of independent and dependent variables,
along with the operationalization of those variables. The
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county is the unit of analysis. Data on all variables is
calculated independently for the gubernatorial elections
of 2002 and 2006, and by county.

absentee ballots with an undervote and dividing by
the total number of ballots cast in the 2006 election,
calculated by county.

Independent Variables
The Voting System was created as a nominal variable and
was coded as follows: Diebold Marksense, ES&S 100,
ES&S Touchscreen, Sequoia Touchscreen, and ES&S
Optech. Baker County was coded as Diebold Marksense
for both 2002 and 2006; the Sequoia Optech system
performed the same in 2006 as similar Marksense
systems in Baker County in 2002 (Florida Division of
Elections, 2003).

Percent Overvote Absentee 2006 is a ratio level variable
constructed by taking the total number of absentee
ballots with an overvote and dividing by the total number
of ballots cast in the 2006 election, calculated by county.

Technology is also a nominal level variable and is defined
as Optical Scan or Touchscreen.
Manufacturer is also a nominal level variable and is
measured as Diebold, ES&S, or Sequoia.
Dependent Variables
Percent Undervote Absentee 2002 is a ratio level variable,
constructed by taking the total number of absentee ballots
with an undervote and dividing by the total number of
ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated by county.
Percent Overvote Absentee 2002 is a ratio level variable
constructed by taking the total number of absentee
ballots with an overvote and dividing by the total number
of ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated by county.
Percent Undervote Precinct 2002 is a ratio level variable
constructed by taking the total number of ballots cast on
Election Day with an undervote and dividing by the total
number of ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated by
county.
Percent Overvote Precinct 2002 is a ratio level variable
constructed by taking the total number of ballots cast on
Election Day with an overvote and dividing by the total
number of ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated
by county.
Percent Total Undervote and Overvote 2002 is a ratio
level variable constructed by taking the sum of all ballots
(absentee and precinct) with an undervote or an overvote
and dividing by the total number of ballots cast in the
2002 elections, calculated by county.
Percent Undervote Absentee 2006 is a ratio level dependent
variable constructed by taking the total number of
Published by STARS, 2006

Percent Undervote Precinct 2006 is a ratio level variable
constructed by taking the total number of undervotes for
non-absentee ballots and dividing by the total votes cast
in the 2006 election in a given county. For optical scan
counties that blend technology, the percent undervote
from touchscreen voting is not included to make the
variable consistent with its 2002 counterpart. This
variable allows precinct ballots cast in a county to be
either 100% touchscreen or optical scan.
Percent Undervote Precinct 2006 Touchscreen is a ratio
level variable constructed by taking the total number of
undervotes cast on touchscreen systems and dividing by
the total votes cast, calculated by county for the 2006
gubernatorial election. This variable was constructed for
all 67 counties; in optical scan the percent was calculated
as the total undervote on touchscreen ballots divided by
total votes cast on touchscreen ballots in that optical scan
county.
Percent Overvote Precinct 2006 is a ratio level variable
constructed by taking the total number of overvotes
for optical scan systems and dividing by the total votes
cast. For touchscreen counties, a value of 0 was entered
(touchscreens are programmed to eliminate overvotes).
For touchscreen counties, this variable represents the
percent of overvotes produced by touchscreen systems.
For optical scan counties (blended), this variable
represents the percent of overvotes produced by optical
scan systems (the only system capable of producing
overvotes that is currently used in Florida counties).
Percent Total Undervote and Overvote 2006 is a ratio level
variable constructed by taking the total number of ballots
with undervotes and overvotes (including absentee and
touchscreens in blended counties), and dividing by
the total votes cast, calculated by county. This variable
represents the sum of the total percent of undervotes
and overvotes in a given county for both optical scan and
touchscreen ballots in 2006.
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ANALYSIS
Hypothesis 1: Table 1 shows the mean comparison
for percent of undervote and overvote for precinct
cast ballots, and for the percent of total voter error
for all ballots for the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial
elections. Counties using touchscreen technology have
lower voter error rates than counties using optical scan
systems for 2006, but the hypothesized relation does
not hold true for the 2002 election cycle. According to
the independent-sample t-test, the mean difference is
not statistically significant at the .05 level for the total
overvotes and undervotes in the 2006 elections; there is
no significant relation between total voter error and the
voting technology used.
In the 2002 elections, touchscreen systems were still a
relatively new voting technology. Voters would have
been more familiar with systems designed around paper
ballots such as optical scan systems. The higher mean
percent error for touchscreen systems as compared to
optical scan systems may have been due to the lack of
voter familiarity with touchscreen voting systems. The
decrease in the mean for total error for touchscreen
systems of .047 may have been due to increased voter
familiarity with touchscreen systems gained between the
2002 and 2006 election cycle, although the difference is
not statistically significant.
Counties that use touchscreen voting systems have
lower overvoting rates than optical scan counties. This
relation between voting technology and overvoting is
supported by the mean comparison for 2002, but the
mean difference is not significant for the 2006 election
(Table 1). The mean for touchscreen counties in both
2002 and 2006 was 0 percent, resulting from the fact
that touchscreen systems have been programmed to
eliminate overvoting by preventing the voter from
designating more than the allowed number of choices for
a given ballot question. Optical scan ballots do not have
the same stringent safeguards as touchscreen systems
to prevent overvoting. The lack of safeguards and the
reliance on voters to correct their own mistakes leads to
the gap in overvoting between these two systems. There
was no statistically significant relation between voting
technology and overvoting for the 2006 election; this
lack may be the result of several factors, including the use
of precinct tabulators at polling sites using optical scan
ballots in 2006. As predicted, overvoting in the 2002 and
2006 elections was not a major contributor to the overall
rate of voter error in both optical scan and touchscreen
counties.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/5

There was no statistically significant relationship between
voting technology and undervoting for the mean
comparison table (Table 1). According to the t-test, the
mean difference is not statistically significant for the
percent undervote in the 2006 election, and optical scan
counties actually had a lower mean voter error rate in the
2002 election. The undervote was the most significant
contributor to overall voter error for both election cycles
as predicted. Between the 2002 and 2006 elections, the
mean percent error for overvoting on touchscreen systems
did fall by .047 percent, and the mean percent error for
voting on optical scan systems increased by a mean
difference of .4769 percent. The decreased undervoting
on touchscreen systems between election cycles may
have been a product of increased voter familiarity and
awareness of the various safeguards that prompt the
voter to correct undervoting on touchscreen systems.
The increase in undervoting between election cycles may
have been caused by numerous factors, including voter
confusion or disinterest in the gubernatorial race.
Hypothesis 2: Table 2 shows the mean comparison for
the percent of overvotes and undervotes for absentee
ballots in the 2002 and 2006 election cycles. The
hypothesized relationship between undervoting on
absentee ballots and the primary voting systems used
on Election Day was supported by the data for the
2002 election, but not for the 2006 election. The mean
difference for percent undervotes in the 2006 election
was statistically significant according to the t-test; the
mean difference was not significant for the 2002. The
mean difference for the percent undervoting on absentee
ballots in 2002 was .0892 percent, more than the mean
for undervoting on absentee ballots in touchscreen
counties in 2002. The mean difference for undervoting
on absentee ballots in 2006 was .4664, almost one-half
of one percent. F.S. Section 102.141 mandates a manual
recount if a candidate is defeated or eliminated by onehalf of a percent or less.
The gap in undervoting on absentee ballots between
touchscreen and optical scan counties, which use the
same technology for absentee ballots, may be explained
by ballot design and voter experience. Touchscreen
counties are more urbanized and have more voters than
optical scan counties. Previous studies have suggested
that urbanized and larger counties have lower voter
error rates in general compared to smaller, less urbanized
counties.
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Hypothesis 3: The hypothesized relationship between
overvoting on absentee ballots and the primary voting
system used on Election Day was supported by the data
(Table 2). The mean difference for overvotes in the 2002
and 2006 elections was not statistically significant. As
hypothesized, there was no relation between overvoting
on absentee ballots and voting technology used in a
county. The mean difference for overvoting on absentee
ballots for the 2002 gubernatorial election was .0032;
this difference is not very meaningful, although it
may be worth noting that optical scan counties had a
higher error rate. The mean difference for overvoting on
absentee ballots in 2006 was .0111. The mean difference
is not meaningful, at only one-hundredth of one percent
in 2006 and less than one-hundredth of one percent
in 2002. If a recount were ordered, the voter error for
overvotes on absentee ballots would have little effect on
the outcome.
Hypothesis 4: The hypothesized relationship between
voter error for ES&S and Diebold optical scan systems
is supported by the data for the 2002 election, but not
for the 2006 election (Table 4). The mean differences for
overvotes in the 2002 and 2006 election were statistically
significant according to the t-test. The mean difference
for undervotes and total voter error was statistically
significant in the 2002 election, but was not significant
for the 2006 election. ES&S optical scan systems do
not produce error rates similar to Diebold optical scan
systems, as ES&S systems produce higher average rates
of both overvotes and undervotes. The mean difference
for total undervotes and overvotes in 2002 for the two
systems was .5426 and in 2006, it was .2995. For both
election cycles, ES&S systems produce higher undervote
rates. Clearly, not all manufacturers provide equally
accurate systems. Different systems have different
restrictions on ballot designs. These restrictions can lead
to poorly designed ballots. Poorly designed and confusing
ballots can increase voter error as suggested by numerous
studies.
Hypothesis 5: The hypothesized relationship between
voter error for ES&S and Sequoia touchscreen systems
is supported by the data (See Table 4). The mean
differences for undervotes and total voter error were
statistically significant for both 2002 and 2006; there
is no relation between voter error and manufacturer for
touchscreen systems. The mean difference for the percent
total undervote and overvote in 2002 was .0373, and in
2002, it was .0061. The mean differences are too small
to be meaningful; such differences are unlikely to have
Published by STARS, 2006

an effect on the outcome of a recount. In 2002, ES&S
systems produced a higher mean percent voter error. In
2006, Sequoia systems produced a higher mean percent
voter error. The voter error rates for touchscreen systems
are very similar for both manufacturers. Touchscreen
systems have fewer limits in terms of ballot designs than
do optical scan systems and can therefore be standardized
across manufacturers to produce similarly low voter error
rates.
Hypothesis 6: The hypothesized relationship between
undervoting rates on touchscreen ballots in optical scan
and touchscreen counties was not supported by the data
(Table 3). The mean difference according to the t-test for
undervoting for touchscreen systems for all counties was
not statistically significant for the 2006 election, although
the mean difference for undervoting on touchscreen
ballots between optical scan and touchscreen counties was
.424 , almost one-half of one percent. This difference may
be explained by lack of voter familiarity with touchscreen
systems in counties that previously used only optical scan
ballots. For touchscreen counties, a decline in voter error
was found between the 2002 and 2006 election cycles for
the gubernatorial race. As voters become more familiar
with the new technology, and as poll workers gain more
experience helping voters navigate new equipment, error
rates may continue to decline.
CONCLUSIONS
Are touchscreens the solution? Perhaps. Touchscreens
fared better than optical scan systems in 2006 for
touchscreen counties in terms of voter error reduction,
but many of the mean differences were not significant.
The fact that the percent undervoting on touchscreen
systems was higher in optical scan counties than in
touchscreen counties, and higher than undervoting on
optical scan ballots, points to a possible learning curve for
touchscreen systems. Touchscreen counties experienced a
slight decline in mean percent voter error between 2002
and 2006. It is possible that this trend will continue with
increased voter education programs in states still using
touchscreen systems. From 2002 to 2006, optical scan
systems experienced an increase in total voter error due
to increased undervoting on optical scan ballots.
Touchscreens eliminated overvoting on Election Day in
15 of Florida’s 67 counties. That fact alone can be seen as
a small victory for the technology; however, overvoting
is not as important in determining the outcome of an
election as the undervote is. Touchscreen systems, if fully
utilized, may one day help to render undervoting a non-
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issue. However, the accuracy of these systems can only be
confirmed if they are equipped with voter verified paper
trails to make it possible for an independent recount to
be held.
For optical scan systems, not all manufacturers are
created equal (or at least do not provide equally accurate
systems). ES&S optical scan systems have higher mean
percent undervotes, overvotes, and total voter error rates
as compared to Diebold optical scan systems. Thus, the
manufacturer should be a factor when selecting a voting
system. If counties should reinvest in optical scan systems,
it may be wise to consider manufacturers carefully in
order to ensure the best experience for voters.

rendered inconsequential through better ballot design
and technology. The bottom line of any election is the
accurate interpretation of the voting public’s intent;
therefore, whatever technology a county chooses to
use, that technology must have safeguards to ensure the
highest standards for our democracy.

In terms of touchscreen systems, the manufacturer seems
to be of little consequence when comparing Sequoia
and ES&S machines. Both systems produce a similar
mean percent voter error. The main disadvantage to
touchscreen systems used in Florida was the lack of a
voter verified paper trail, which made it impossible to
conduct independent recounts.
Absentee voters in touchscreen counties fared better in
recording their intent than did voters residing in optical
scan counties for the 2006 election cycle. This curious
phenomenon can be explained by previous studies, which
have found that large urbanized counties have lower error
rates (Sinclair and Alvarez, 2004). Touchscreen county
populations are, on average, larger and more urban than
are optical scan counties.
Finally, touchscreens were increasingly becoming the
system of choice for many counties. This was due in part
to new FEC and HAVA regulations, which emphasize
reducing voter error through improved technology.
However, touchscreens still have many limits and with
the current legislative ban will have a very marginal
place in the electoral landscape. These limits include
overheating, a vulnerability to hackers, and the lack of a
verifiable paper trail.
Many newer versions of DRE machines are equipped
with printers allowing for a verifiable paper trail. As
touchscreen technology develops and these issues are
resolved, it may reappear in Florida, if changes are
made to the legislative framework. As consumers,
counties should continue to demand more from voting
equipment manufacturers to produce auditable systems
that can be easily tailored to a county’s needs. Voter error
may never be a thing of the past, but it can at least be
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/5
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APPENDIX - TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Mean Comparison for Percent Undervote and Overvote for Precinct
Ballots, and Percent Total Undervote and Overvote in 2002 and 2006 by Technology.
Percent
Undervote
Precinct
2002*

Percent
Overvote
Precinct
2002*

Percent
Total
Undervote
and
Overvote
2002*

Percent
Undervote
Precinct
2006

Percent
Overvote
Precinct
2006*

Percent
Total
Undervote
and
Overvote
2006

Mean

.4952

.0385

.7446

.9721

.0733

1.0810

N

52

.52

52

52

52

52

Std.
Deviation

.29323

.05367

.47120

.52182

.08798

.56850

Mean

.9247

.0000

1.0373

.9200

.000

.9480

N

15

15

15

15

15

15

Std.
Deviation

.21464

.00000

.25550

.23649

.00000

.22288

Mean

.5913

.0299

.8101

.9604

.0569

1.0512

N

67

67

67

67

67

67

Std.
Deviation

.32977

.04986

.44781

.47196

.08323

.51322

Optical Scan or
Touchscreen

Optical Scan

Touchscreen

Total

* p < .05
(continued on next page)
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Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Independent Samples Test
Sig.

Percent
Undervote
Precinct 2002

Percent
Overvote
Precinct 2002

Percent Total
Undervote and
Overvote 2002

Percent
Undervote
Precinct 2006

Percent
Overvote
Precinct 2006

Percent Total
Undervote and
Overvote 2006

Published by STARS, 2006

Equal variances
assumed

.286

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed

.001

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed

.053

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed

.045

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

.063

Sig. (2–tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower

Upper

.000

-.42947

-.59231

-.26664

.000

-.42947

-.56972

-.28923

.007

.03846

.01064

.06629

.000

.03846

.02352

.05340

.025

-.29272

-.54669

-.03874

.003

-.29272

-.47992

-.10552

.709

.05212

-.22595

.33019

.584

.05212

-.13784

.24207

.002

.07327

.02766

.11888

.000

.07327

.04878

.09776

.381

.13296

-.16794

.43387

.178

.13296

-.06235

.32828
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Table 2: Mean Comparison Table for Percent Undervote and Overvote
for Absentee Ballots in the 2002 and 2006 Gubernatorial Elections
Percent Undervote Absentee
Ballot 2002

Percent Overvote
Absentee Ballot
2002

Percent Undervote Absentee
Ballots 2006*

Percent Overvote
Absentee Ballots
2006

Mean

.1652

.0219

1.2317

.0958

N

52

52

52

52

Mean

.0760

.0187

.7653

.1067

N

15

15

15

15

Mean

.1452

.0212

1.1273

.0982

N

67

67

67

67

Optical Scan or Touchscreen

Optical Scan

Touchscreen

Total

* p < .05
(Continued on next page)
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Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Independent Samples Test

Percent
Undervote
Absentee
Ballot 2002

Percent
Overvote
Absentee
Ballot 2002

Percent
Undervote
Absentee
Ballots 2006

Percent
Overvote
Absentee
Ballots 2006

Published by STARS, 2006

Equal
variances
assumed

Sig.

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

.078

.164

Equal
variances not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed

.076

Equal
variances not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed

.003

Equal
variances not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed

Equal
variances not
assumed

.653

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower

Upper

.08919

-.03726

.21564

.017

.08919

.01669

.16170

.682

.00326

-.01255

.01906

.604

.00326

-.00938

.01589

.038

.46640

.02650

.90629

.000

.46640

.22181

.71098

.917

-.01090

-.21928

.19749

.871

-.01090

-.14427

.12247
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Table 3: Mean Comparison for Touchscreen Voting in Optical Scan
and Touchscreen Counties Percent Undervote Precinct 2006 Touchscreen
Optical Scan or Touchscreen County

Mean

11

Optical Scan Counties

1.3440

52

Touchscreen Counties

.9200

15

Total

1.2491

67

* p < .05
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Independent Samples Test

Percent
Undervote
Precinct 2006
Touchscreen

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol2/iss1/5

Sig.

.155

Sig. (2–tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower

Upper

.068

.42404

-1.22104

2.06912

.344

.42404

-.46633

1.31440
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Table 4: Mean Comparison for Percent Undervote and Overvote for Percent Undervote, Overvote
and Total Voter Error for Precinct Ballots in 2002 and 2006 by Manufacturer and Voting Technology
Percent
Undervote
Precinct
2002

Percent
Overvote
Precinct
2002

Mean

.4013

0113

.5255

8616

.0326

9600

N

31

31

31

31

31

31

Std.
Deviation

.20808

.01628

.23001

.45074

.02620

.44994

Mean

.6338

.0786

1.0681

1.1352

.1333

1.2595

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

Std.
Deviation

.34709

.06413

.55002

.58543

.11115

.68140

Mean

.9273

.0000

1.0473

.9291

.0000

.9464

N

11

11

11

11

11

11

Std.
Deviation

.23837

.00000

.28398

.23881

.00000

.22571

Mean

.9175

.0000

1.0100

.8950

.0000

.9525

N

4

4

4

4

4

4

Std.
Deviation

.15966

.00000

.18565

.26413

.00000

.24891

Mean

.5913

.0299

.8101

.9604

.0569

1.0512

N

67

67

67

67

67

67

Std.
Deviation

.32977

.04986

.44781

.47196

.08323

.51322

Manufacturer
and
Technology

Diebold
Optical Scan

ES&S Optical
Scan

ES&S
Touchscreen

Sequoia
Touchscreen

Total

Percent Total
Percent
Percent Percent Total
Undervote
Undervote Overvote
Undervote
and Overvote Precinct
Precinct and Overvote
2002
2006
2006
2006

(Continued on next page)
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Independent Samples Test for Diebold Optical
Scan and ES&S Optical Scan

Percent Undervote
Precinct 2002

Percent Overvote
Precinct 2002
Percent Total
Undervote and
Overvote 2002
Percent Undervote
Precinct 2006

Percent Overvote
Precinct 2006
Percent Total
Undervote and
Overvote 2006

Equal variances
assumed

Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances
Sig.

.286

Equal variances
not assumed

Equal variances
assumed

.001

Equal variances
not assumed

Equal variances
assumed

.053

Equal variances
not assumed

Equal variances
assumed

.045

Equal variances
not assumed

Equal variances
assumed

.000

Equal variances
not assumed

Equal variances
assumed

.063

Equal variances
not assumed

Sig.
(2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower

Upper

.000

-.42947

-.59231

-.26664

.000

-.42947

.56972

-.28923

.007

.03846

.01064

.06629

.000

.03846

.02352

.05340

.025

-.29272

-.54669

-.03874

.003

-.29272

-.47992

-.10552

.709

.05212

-.22595

.33019

.584

.05212

-.13784

.24207

.002

.07327

.02766

.11888

.000

.07327

.04878

.09776

.381

.13296

-.16794

.43387

.178

.13296

-.06235

.32828
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Independent Samples Test for ES&S
Touchscreen and Sequoia Touchscree

Percent Undervote
Precinct 2002
Percent Total
Undervote and
Overvote 2002
Percent Undervote
Precinct 2006
Percent Total
Undervote and
Overvote 2006

Published by STARS, 2006

Equal variances
assumed

Levene’s
Test for
Equality of
Variances
Sig.

Sig.
(2-tailed)

.308

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed

.397

Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed

.832

Equal variances
not assumed

Equal variances
assumed

.869

Equal variances
not assumed
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Mean
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower

Upper

.941

.00977

-.27113

.29067

.930

.00977

-.23681

.25635

.813

.03727

-.29642

.37097

.775

.03727

-.25130

.32585

.815

.03409

-.27480

.34298

.830

.03409

-.35452

.42270

.964

-.00614

-.29786

.28559

.967

-.00614

-.37233

.36006
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Figure 1: Bar Graph of Means for Percent Undervote, Overvote, and
Total Voter Error in the 2002 and 2006 Election
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